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Much has been written about the recent German Constitutional Court (GCC) ruling
which has essentially dismantled the 2018 judgement of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) over the legality of the ECB Quantitative Easing Program. 
Much more will be written. I will limit myself here in analysing what I believe is
the “macroeconomic” essence of the ruling. «The PSPP improves the refinancing
conditions of the Member States as it allows them to obtain financing on the capital
markets at considerably better conditions than would otherwise be the case» [§ 170].
«In particular, the PSPP could […] have the same effect as financial assistance
instruments pursuant to Art. 12 et seq . ESM Treaty», at the risk of preventing
those Member States «from adopting own measures to pursue a sound budgetary
policy» [§ 171].
The GCC sets a clear condition: if the ECB wants to reduce yield spreads, and
therefore decrease the financing costs of “certain” Member States, the beneficiary
Member States must abide by the framework of the ESM. Which means, for
those unfortunate Member States, to run the concrete risk of losing control of
their fiscal policies. By looking at the Greek experience, debtor Member States
run the risk of being forced to offer their strategic assets to creditor countries, and
doing so at bargain prices. It does not end here. When creditors are also your
competitors, falling under their control is unlikely to foster economic recipes capable
of relaunching the debtor States economies.
There is a significant conflict of interest here: any production loss in a debtor State is
likely to turn into a competitive advantage for companies located in a creditor State.
Even more likely, creditors will aim at salvaging those companies and economic
areas which are functional to the value chain connected to their own countries (for
example Northern Italy is tightly integrated into Germany’s value chain). On the other
hand creditors are likely to enforce cuts on less strategic assets (such as Southern
Italy or the Public Administration), letting the “sovereign” debtor State pick up the
pieces and manage the resulting social consequences of such a Darwinian process.
 
Such a scenario is quite different from the irenic vision of a new form of “functional
sovereignty” which should have characterized the EU according to influential
theories. According to those theories, the lost prerogatives of the member states are
not served by anybody, not even a European “Super State”. Sovereignty, according
- 1 -
to MacCormick, is «more like virginity», it can – more or less happily – be lost without
anybody else gaining it. In the post-westphalian era of «late sovereignty», functional
borders should exist along land borders between States and supranational entities,
with the aim of creating functional, rather than territorial, communities. 
Such functional borders would be controlled by the regulatory bodies of the
supranational entity (ECJ, ECB) which will claim for themselves the last word on any
matter under their competence (“Kompetenz-Kompetenz”), without replacing the
corresponding national bodies of the Member States, and therefore without the need
to give birth to a true federal state (N. Walker).
This would be further confirmed, according to those irenistic visions, by the outcome
of possible conflicts between these “functionally sovereign” entities and the Member
States: the victory of the supranational entity over a functional dispute (for example
over the legitimacy of unconventional monetary policies by the ECB which have
been ruled ultra vires by Germany) does not menace the very existence of the
territorial entity nor its authority over the remaining territorial prerogatives (whereas
the disputes between sovereign states would have resulted in the annexation of the
contended territory under the winning sovereign).
The institutional conflict which we are witnessing is disproving such irenistic
interpretation the subject. It is not by chance that such theories originated at the
very beginning of the Euro single currency adventure by Scottish authors. The
GCC seems to have no intention of abiding to the ECJ ruling in favour of the ECB
in the above-mentioned dispute, notwithstanding such dispute is purely functional
and not territorial. Probably the GCC, reflecting part of the German public opinion,
considers perfectly legitimate the phenomenon – described by Giacché as “monetary
annexation” – by which control of production within a monetary union must be
given to the “more deserving” actors. Once again, a Darwinian perspective which
ignores the notion that diverging yield spreads will make access to credit prohibitive
to businesses situated in peripheral Member States, negating the concept of fair
competition versus “more deserving” businesses situated in the stronger Member
States (Chessa).  
In such an occurrence, the weaker Member State will end up seeing its sovereignty
(the real one) diminished and curtailed by the outcome of a border dispute,
notwithstanding the “functional” nature of the latter: if the ECB cannot control yield
spreads via its Quantitative Easing programme, the fate of weaker Member States
will purely depend from the benevolence of the creditor committee of the ESM. 
A more realistic interpretation of the phenomenon we are witnessing is that the
ECB, within the context of the freedom of movement of capital, can only regulate
the rhythm of the centralization of capital, i.e. the speed at which strong capital
on the core of the system, can acquire weaker capital on the periphery of the EU
(Brancaccio et al.). Under this view, the GCC, with the precedent of Gauweiler and
even more so with the current Weiss e a. case, has manifested its impatience for
such a slow pace of centralization of capital. 
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A final consideration: provided that “functional sovereignty”, rather than territorial
sovereignty, can truly regulate disputes amongst European Member States, such
post- modern sovereignty can only be accepted to the extent in which it is not
presented as such, ie. as a form of “supremacy”. Supremacy within the EU in
fact already exists in the elegant and refined shape of the “primacy” of EU law
over national law, theoretically over their constitutions as well. Such primacy
is a “doctrine” of the ECJ since the ruling Costa v. Enel in 1964. An attempt to
resurface occurred in the «Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe», signed
in Rome in 2004, but later abandoned before its coming into force because of the
French and Dutch referenda in 2005. Article I-6 of that Treaty declared that «The
[European] Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising
competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the Member States».
Today, such primacy is hidden in the Declaration n. 17 of the Lisbon Treaty, which in
a quite casuistic style refers to the ECJ doctrine. 
It’s certainly true that a declaration attached to the Lisbon Treaty «has, like its
Protocols, the same legal value as the Treaties» (Ziller) but it’s also reasonably
true that its political and constitutional legitimacy comes out rather diminished. It
was therefore not an oversight by the Public Relations office of the ECJ when,
in commenting the rebellion of the GCC against the ECJ ruling on QE of 2018, it
refrained from mentioning the primacy of EU law, focusing instead over the more
digestible concept of uniformity of application of EU law and legal certainty as
indispensable instruments to guarantee «the equality of Member States in the Union
they created».
We do know though that within this Union Germany, despite all the benefits it
has so far reaped, feels “less equal” than others. At least this is the stance of the
GCC which, when ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, stated that the European Parliament
is inadequate in democratically representing German citizens, because of the
modalities in which parliamentary seats are allocated to the Member States
(“digressive proportionality”). «As a result the weight of the vote of a citizen from a
Member State with a small population may be about twelve times the weight of the
vote of a citizen from a Member State with a large population» (Lissabon-Urteil, §
284).
The GCC is basically telling us that if the European Parliament wants to manage
truly federal powers, therefore a budget worthy of its name, including the power to
issue Eurobonds, it can do so if and only if its structure and composition are turned
upside down, with all due respect of smaller countries such as Malta or Cyprus. A
detail over which we should all ponder, before putting our faith in the cathartic value
that crisis can have over the European institutional framework.
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